The paper first examines the difference between Wolff’s demonstration of my present existence and Descartes’ intuitive connection of my thinking with my existence. The results of this investigation enable us to analyse two controversial answers to the question of the knowledge of existence in Wolff’s works. The first answer is from Jürgen Stolzenberg, who discusses Wolff’s proof of the statement: I am. The second is written by Luigi Cataldi Madonna, who investigates the concept of contingent existence in Wolff’s works. The (...) problems of the interpretations they propose are different. The first uses in his analysis meanings of central terms that were foreign to Wolff. The second does not pay attention to Wolff’s framework and aims. These difficulties in their interpretations distort what Wolff does and plans in his treatment of the knowledge of existence. Wolff builds a demonstration to prove how we know that we are, because for Wolff there is only science if we prove all that we claim. According to him, philosophy is a science. With this paper I plan to clarify the context of Wolff’s demonstration of my present existence as well as the demonstration itself, to which the analysis of the above two interpretations can contribute. (shrink)